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 WHAT IS ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY? 
 
1. OPENING 
 At the onset, a Methodological Remark: In trying to answer the question What is ana-
lytic philosophy? I shall follow two methodological principles. (1) The first was sug-
gested by Peter Hacker and reads: ‗Any characterisation of ―analytic philosophy‖ which 
excludes Moore, Russell and the later Wittgenstein, as well as the leading figures of 
post-War analytic philosophy [for us these are John Wisdom, Ryle, Austin, Strawson 
and Dummett], must surely be rejected.‘ (Hacker 1996a, p. 247) The correct definition 
of analytic philosophy must cohere with the philosophy of its generally recognized 
founding fathers. (2) Any characterisation of ‗analytic philosophy‘ which was massively 
represented in the history of philosophy in the past, must be rejected too. To be sure, 
Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein, and later also Ryle, Austin and their friends, were do-
ing a type of philosophy which they consciously understood as new—it was intrinsically 
New Philosophy. The problem was only that this newness was difficult to identify and 
define. 
 
2. MISLEADING DEFINITIONS 
 There is a host of definitions of analytic philosophy which fail to meet our two meth-
odological requirements. 
 (a) Analytic Philosophy is Philosophical Logic. Many authors believe that despite all 
diffusion of the subject, analytic philosophy typically accepts the ‗theory of logical form 
as a regulating ideal relative to which all philosophical analyses are ultimately to be giv-
en‘ (Cocchiarella 1987, p. 2). Originally, this understanding was introduced by Frege 
who persistently discriminated between true and apparent logical form. Since Wittgen-
stein, and partly also Russell, followed this practice, many believe that it is essential to 
the New Philosophy. To be sure, even the majority of the so called ‗soft analysts‘, for 
example, Moore and Ryle, followed some axioms of the philosophical logic. There 
were, however, exceptions, such like John Wisdom and Friedrich Waismann. The two 
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had nothing to do with philosophical logic. This shows that this definition of analytic 
philosophy is not correct. 
 (b) Philosophy of Language is prima philosophia. Modification of this belief is the 
understanding, in Dummett‘s formulation, that 
 
what distinguishes analytical philosophy, in its diverse manifestations, from other 
schools is the belief, first, that a philosophical account of thought can be attained through 
a philosophical account of language, and, secondly, that a comprehensive account can be 
only so attained. (Dummett 1993, p. 4) 
 
The pre-analytical philosophers, in contrast, were directly interested in investigating 
thinking. A typical example is the philosophy of Descartes.  
 Dummett‘s main contention, with which I strongly disagree, is that analytic philoso-
phy is post-Fregean philosophy: 
 
Important as Russell and Moore both were, [their philosophy] neither was the, or even a, 
source of analytical philosophy. ... The sources of analytical philosophy were the writ-
ings of philosophers who wrote, principally or exclusively, in the German language. 
(Dummett 1993, p. ix) 
 
On the contrary, I support the conventional view, expressed recently in Hacker 1996b, 
that Moore and Russell were the real founding fathers of analytic philosophy. 
 Criticism of Dummett. Fortunately, not all philosophers accept the thesis of the in-
trinsically linguistic character of analytic philosophy. Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker, 
for example, have noted some twenty years ago: 
 
It is curious to find Dummett and Sluga joining hands in contending that Frege was the 
founder of analytic philosophy, the characteristic tenet of which is that philosophy of 
language is the foundation of the rest of philosophy. If ‗analytic philosophy‘ includes the 
later Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Austin among its luminaries, if analytic philosophy of law 
includes Hart or Kelsen, if analytic philosophy of history includes Berlin or Dray, if ana-
lytic philosophy of politics includes Nozick or Rawls, then it is not a characteristic tenet 
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of the ‗school‘. On the contrary, it would be denied, both in theory and in practice, by all 
these philosophers. (Baker and Hacker 1984, p. 7 n.) 
 
In the last years there has been a strong tendency to accept this view. Today, even more 
authors are beginning to realise that what I read in Chisholm, Perry, Nozick, Kripke, 
Evans, Lewis, Kaplan, Putnam and Dennett are ‗conceptual analyses, which are unjustly 
called ―language-analytical‖ ‘ (Frank 1992, p. 419). 
 But it is also a historical fact that a variant of analytic philosophy has been developed 
which was expressly not a philosophy of language—Brentano‘s school of descriptive 
psychology. The main innovation of this school was ‗the introduction of a new level of 
exactness into philosophy‘ (Mulligan 1986, p. 86). Brentano did not believed that this 
exactness is to be introduced via analysis of language. According to him, ‗philosophy 
must be [simply] rigorous, scientific, exact and clear‘, referring to possible coun-
ter-examples and counterfactuals. Talking about Kant‘s ‗monstrous, in their arrogance, 
philosophems‘ (Brentano 1975, p. 8) Brentano was (as if in G. E. Moore‘s manner) 
above all against the unclarity in thinking and language. This was a tradition of ‗criti-
cism of every sort of anti-scientific and obscure philosophizing‘ (Mulligan 1986, p. 89), 
and nothing beyond that. 
 (c) Analytic Philosophy is Anti-Speculative Philosophy. Analytic philosophy is also 
not simply the opposite to speculative philosophy. To be sure, at the beginning, analytic 
and speculative philosophy were used (for example, by C. D. Broad and John Wisdom) 
not contrarily, but complementary with clear division in their competencies. 
 In truth, it was only after the Vienna romantic reading of the ideas of the Tractatus 
that the militant attitude of analytic philosophy towards speculative metaphysics was 
accepted. For Russell himself, philosophy essentially consists of speculations. When 
asked in 1960 What philosophy is?, he answered: ‗Philosophy consists of speculations 
about matters where exact knowledge is not yet possible.‘ (Russell 1960, p. 11) 
 Apparently, ‗speculative‘, as used by analytic philosophers, is not a descriptive term. 
This explains the readiness with which typically analytical philosophers often get fasci-
nated with typical speculative philosophers. Wittgenstein‘s interest in Spengler, 
Spranger, etc. is the best example for this. 
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 (d) Analytic Philosophy is Clarification. In a famous paper, published more than a 
half a century ago, Henry Price used the concepts ‗clarification‘ and ‗analysis‘ as syno-
nyms (see Price 1945, p. 3); to him, analytic philosophers are ‗clarificatory philoso-
phers‘. Unfortunately, this, too, is not a comprehensive definition of analytic philoso-
phy. Indeed, while the latter was introduced as something totally new—as a revolution 
in philosophy—in the history of philosophy, already Epicures (among many others) 
‗was so lucid a writer that in the work On Rhetoric he makes clearness the sole requi-
site‘ (Diog. Laert., Vitae philosophorum, X,13). Later, philosophy was often seen as a 
clarification, for example, by the romanticists (Rousseau), by Hermann Lotze in the 19
th
 
century, or in the early 20
th
 century by the critical realist Hans Cornelius, or by the neo-
Kantian Leonard Nelson. 
 (e) Analytic Philosophy Consists of Analyses. Some authors (see Hacker 1996a; 
Monk 1996) have recently underlined that analytic philosophy is characterised, above 
all, by making analysis. 
 Of course, analysis is an important part of the methodology of the New Philosophy. 
Nevertheless, there were exceptions. Gilbert Ryle, for example, was explicit that the 
New Philosophy is not occupied with analysis. (See Ryle 1949, p. 203) 
 Secondly, the method of analysis was introduced in philosophy not by Moore, or Rus-
sell, but already by Plato. Later, the method of analysis was often considered to be the phi-
losophy proper. Thus, the ‗eighteen-century European philosophy, in general, and the 
German Enlightenment, prior to Kant‘s ―Critique of Pure Reason‖, in particular, largely 
conceived of themselves as analytic philosophers‘ in this sense (Engfer 1982, p. 10). This 
was characteristic for both rationalists (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz), and empiricist 
(Locke, Berkeley, Hume). All they hoped to achieve conceptions of philosophical method 
with the help of mathematical methodology called more geometrico, or arte combinatoria. 
 (f) Analytic Philosophy is Exact Philosophy. Some authors accept that analytic phi-
losophy can be defined as ‗exact philosophy‘, meaning with this, above all, scientific 
philosophy (see Mulligan 1993, p. 133). 
 Criticism. First of all, there is an idiosyncratic use of the term ‗exact‘, as used in ‗ex-
act sciences‘, which means that philosophic theories are expressed in precise terms and 
figures. Thus recently the term ‗exact philosophy‘ was used ‗to signify mathematical 
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philosophy, i.e. philosophy done with the explicit help of mathematical logic and math-
ematics‘ (Bunge 1973, p. v). This certainly is not the comprehensive description of the 
authentic analytic philosophy. 
 Secondly, there were heroic efforts to build something like exact philosophy in the 
past which didnot led to establishing something similar to the authentic analytic philos-
ophy. Such an attempt was made, for example, in 1877–8 in Germany with the launch of 
Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, under the editorship of Richard 
Avenarius. The program of the movements was: Philosophy must be occupied with sci-
entific problems, the sources of which came from experience; it must be a theory of sci-
ence and knowledge. 
 Historically, this program was a result of the final separation of church and state in 
Germany, reflected in the so called Kulturkampf in this country from after 1872. Unfor-
tunately, after 1878, as a reaction to the increasing influence of the socialism in Germa-
ny (of the social democrats), the program was replaced by a new interest towards practi-
cal philosophy. Apparently, the authentic analytic philosophy emerged in a specific so-
cial context (which I shall discuss in § 4). 
 But I have also another, third, argument against defining analytic philosophy as ‗ex-
act philosophy‘. One of the most prominent figures of the Oxford school of language 
philosophy, J. L. Austin was explicitly against the strive for exactness in philosophy. 
 
2. WHAT IT IS?  
 Analytic philosophy can be defined at least in two perspectives: theoretical, and 
historical. 
 (a) Historically, analytic philosophy was introduced as a revolution in philosophy, as 
a New Philosophy.
1
 This is an essential point of the British analytic philosophy, shared 
by the both (so called) Cambridge and the Oxford School. From this perspective, the 
most concise description of Russell‘s philosophy is: ‗[It] unmasked the great 
nineteenth-century metaphysicians as authors of a monstrous hoax played upon 
generations eager to be deceived.‘ (Berlin 1997, p. 604) 
                                                          
1
 Some authors speak in this connection of ‗philosophy‘s second Revolution‘, the philosophy of Descartes 
being its first Revolution (see Clarke 1997). 
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 It is true that nowadays, ‗the movement has lost its former revolutionary ethos. It is 
no longer a philosophy fighting prejudices and superstitions. ... It has, to some extend, 
itself become an idol, enthroned in self- satisfaction and thus inviting new iconclasts.‘ 
(von Wright 1993, pp. 41–2) This, however, is nothing but the present-day actualisation 
of the danger of ‗analytic scholasticism‘, which was identified already by Frank 
Ramsey. 
 (b) Theoretically, analytic philosophy means ‗rigorous philosophy‘.2 Its aim is to 
produce theories, ideas, theses, which bear examination through contra arguments. 
Authentic analytic philosophy is ‗examined philosophy‘: examined by the reason. Its 
best description was given by its founding father Russell in his paper ‗Mysticism and 
Logic‘: This is a philosophy which uses ‗the harmonizing mediation of reason, which 
tests our beliefs by their mutual compatibility, and examines, in doubtful cases, the 
possible sources of error on the one side and on the other.‘ (Russell 1918, p. 17) This is 
a procedure of ‗scientific restrain and balance‘ (ibid., p. 20). In opposition, the Old 
Philosophy (called later, misleadingly, ‗continental‘) produces theories, ideas, which do 
not bear such an examination. As a result, they are consistent only for sympathetic 
minds. Seen from counter-perspective, they quickly disintegrate. 
 This broad definition of the analytic philosophy suggests that it is something like an 
approach, not a doctrine. Recently, it was rightly noted that ‗what distinguished analytic 
philosophy is rather a particular way of approaching philosophical problems‘ (Føllesdal 
1996, p. 196).  
 This position is in accordance with the following fact. For decades it was claimed 
that analytic philosophy has a rather narrow subject-matter. In the last years, though, it 
got clear that using this approach, a wide variety of topics can be treated. As recently 
noted, ‗the sphere of interest of analytic philosophy began to widen out in the late fifties, 
and there are now few philosophical questions that have not fallen within its purview‘ 
(Mulligan 1993, p. 139). This insight would be expendable if analytic philosophers paid 
more attention to Russell‘s instructions that the New Philosophy ‗is, in essence, not 
                                                          
2
 Ironically, this term was first used by Edmund Husserl in the title of his book Philosophy as a Rigorous 
Science (1910/11). 
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contrary to that spirit [to mysticism] . . . , but rather [to] the outcome of this very spirit 
as applied to the realm of thought‘ (Russell 1918, p. 21). 
 
 
3. FACTIONS 
 A main difficulty by investigating the history of analytic philosophy is that it was 
essentially dualistic from the very beginning. Despite having a common strategy—
philosophy must be rigorous!—the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Moore and 
Russell, embraced different tactics for its realising: while Russell was scientifically 
oriented, Moore was mainly an analytic hermeneut (a term to be explained bellow). 
Indeed, they were not pure, but mainly so. Thus shortly before 1900 Russell urged 
Moore to embrace philosophical logic—and the latter really did so. On the other hand, 
despite being a scientific philosopher, Russell always believed that the New Philosophy 
has its own—called by him ‗analytic‘—method, which, in fact, he understood as close to 
Moore‘s analytic hermeneutics.  In contrast, to the later analytic philosophers, Quine 
and Davidson (I consciously oppse them to the early analytic philosophers), Russell 
always was a bit analytic hermeneut. In particular, he believed that he has established a 
specific philosophical method with the help of which he can fight the old, ‗scolastic‘ 
philosophy. Unfortunately, Russell failed to articulate it. 
 This dualism lies at the very bottom of the project for a New Philosophy and thus 
was of first rate importance for the future development of the movement. In particular, it 
gave rise to the later split in it in two wings: that of analytic hermeneutics, and that of 
reasons-supplying analytism, which I am going to discuss now. 
 (a) As already mentioned, analytic hermeneutic was introduced by Moore.
3
 It was 
marked by his question: ‗What on Earth means this philosophical proposition?‘ Moore 
thus repeatedly tried ‗to translate the proposition[s of philosophers] into the concrete‘ 
(Moore 1917, p. 209).  
 This branch of the new strict philosophy was developed further during and 
immediately after the second world war by Wittgenstein, John Wisdom and Ryle, who 
                                                          
3
 The very term was not used by Moore. G. H. von Wright introduced something like this term in his 
1971, p. 181 n. 86. 
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always believed that their philosophy is something of a sly method. After 1955, Austin 
made a considerable retreat from this kind of analytic philosophy with his theory of 
speach-acts, which is something of a grand linguistic theory. About the same time, 
Strawson abandoned it altogether, advancing the linguistic ontology of his Individuals.  
 Disadvantages. Its main disadvantage was that this type of analytic philosophy easily 
(although not of necessity) turned into what was called in the time ‗philosophy without 
tears‘: a general discussion of general topics. Another disadvantage: Lacking a specific 
subject, it was difficult to be taught in the overcrowded mass universities of the 
post-second world war world. 
 (b) Reasons-supplying Analytism. That is why the analytic approach to philosophy 
had a strong inclination to take another form: to build consistent systems of statements, 
every one of which has a reason (or ground).
4
 No surprise on this point indeed. To be 
sure, it seems the most direct way to arrive at strict philosophy. In pactice, it took quite 
different forms: of (i) philosophical logic; (ii) formal philosophy; (iii) philosophical 
grammar; (iv) formal ontology; (v) analytic epistemology; etc. 
 Historically, this form of analytism had three main forms: (1) Frege introduced it as a 
discipline investigating the strict deduction of mathematics, which, according to him, is 
identical with logic. (2) Russell developed it as an investigation of the ultimate structure 
of human experience, for example, in his Our Knowledge of the External World. (3) In 
the post-second world war Oxford, it took the form of investigating the structure of 
human concepts. This movement reached its pinnacle in 1959 with the publishing of 
Peter Strawson‘s Individuals and of Stuart Hampshire‘s Thought and Action. The period 
of ‗analytic anarchy‘, reigning in Britain during and immediately after the ‗trouble 
times‘ of the second world war, associated with the names of Wittgenstein, Ryle, and 
especially John Wisdom, and with the practice of what I already have called analytic 
hermeneutic, came to an end. 
 By the mid-1960s, the triumph of the reasons-supplying analytism became 
irreversible. In 1963 Michael Dummett, in his paper on (anti-) ‗Realism‘, and Donald 
Davidson, in ‗Actions, Reasons, and Causes‘, presented decisive arguments for a kind of 
                                                          
4
 Cf. with this definition of analytic philosophy advanced by J. L. Cohen: ‗The unifying force in analytical 
philosophy is its engagement with the reasoned investigation of reasons.‘ (Cohen 1986, p. 57) 
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an analytical counter-revolution. The answer of the analytic hermeneuts Ryle, Strawson 
(who until the mid-1950s was an analytic hermeneut) and Pears was a resignation into 
historic investigations: of Plato, Kant, and Russell, respectively. This tendency was 
topped by Michael Dummett‘s total historicising of analytic philosophy in his studies on 
Frege.
5
 
 Disadvantages. They are even more conspicuous than that of the analytic 
hermeneutics. Already before the second world war it was noted that one of the reasons 
for the attractiveness of analytic philosophy is that it suggests ‗intellectual games with 
chess-like indifference. ... It is the sheer intellectual virtuosity of the performance which 
in large measure captivates student interest.‘ (Nagel 1956, p. 197) 
 Unfortunately, since the aim of this type of analytic philosophy is, first and foremost, 
to built strictly consistent systems of statements, it easily turns to a mind-game. What is 
characteristic of it is that the philosophical-game creates in the players the illusion that it 
is actually not a game, but rather something utterly ‗serious‘—very serious indeed. 
 The results are exemplars of what Ramsey has called ‗analytic scholastics‘. An 
example: when theory of thinking was replaced by theory of reference, all believed that 
a new age in philosophy began life. Unfortunately, the expected perspicuity didn‘t came. 
Today the ‗current theories of reference are as dense and varied as reflections on the 
Trinity of Byzantine philology‘ (Danto 1980, p. 634). 
 
4. SOCIAL-POLITICAL CONTEXT 
 As already noted, decisive by the emergence of the real analytic philosophy was a 
series of social and political factors.  
 (a) The Emergence of Animous Philosophical Communities. Of special importance 
was the proneness to group in friendly and animus ‗blocks‘—this most typical product 
of the twentieth century. 
 G. H. von Wright has recently pointed out that analytic philosophy ‗is yet by and 
large connected with Anglo-American cultural influence‘ (von Wright 1993, p. 634). 
                                                          
5
 In Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Philosophy, P. M. S. Hacker falsely took the reasons-
supplying turn in the English analytic philosophy as the end of analytic philosophy as such (see Hacker 
1996b). Besides, he states incorrectly that this took place in the mid-1970s. In fact, this was prepared in 
some developments from the mid-1950s and, as just shown, was made explicit in the mid-1960s. 
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Danto also found that ‗its spirit, tone, and technologies dominate not only in America 
and the Commonwealth, but throughout Western civilization, of which France is not 
altogether a part‘ (Danto 1980, p. 615). 
 My claim is analytic philosophy was developed in the struggle for intellectual power 
between German and British philosophy in the first decades of this century. Its birth 
marked the victory of the latter over the former. In the literature it was already noticed 
that ‗Germany‘s dramatic rise to power in the sixties of the last [nineteenth] century was 
impressive enough to make the leading British philosophers of the next generation—
Caird, T. H. Green, Bosanquet, McTaggart—ardent Hegelians‘ (Carr 1939, p. 70). This 
were the cultural grounds of the rise of the British neo-Hegelianism. Conversely, ‗in 
both Britain and America, the [first world] war accelerated the decline of idealism, dis-
missed as a German philosophy‘. (Sluga 1993, p. 76) This gave rise to analytic philoso-
phy. 
 To be sure, the Zeitgeist of the 1920s was marked off by a real race for philosophical 
surpremacy in Europe. Paraphrasing Karl Marx, in Germany and Britain philosophers 
‗united themselves‘, in the same time opposing the current philosophy in the rival coun-
try. Thus, the last great German positivist, which for a long time has worked in parallel 
to Moore and Russell, the neo-Kantian Paul Natorp, turned to the tradition of German 
metaphysics (see Wetz 1993). Husserl too, after being up to 1913 essentially analytic 
philosopher, soon came closer to ‗speculative‘ philosophy. After 1916 he moved to 
Freiburg where contributed decisively to grounding of the so called ‗Freiburg School‘, 
which marked the bottom of the ‗deepening‘ of the German philosophy. The most cele-
brated product of this school was Martin Heidegger‘s Sein und Zeit (1927). 
 (b) The Jena Connection. In this context, the Anglo-Saxon fear of German intellectu-
al invasion is easy to understand. It was especially strong between the two world wars. 
But also in 1971 Brian Magee and Anthony Quinton have expressed the worry that the 
Modern British Philosophy 
 
moves from German Idealism to German Idealism. We started at the beginning of the cen-
tury with a predominantly Hegelian orthodoxy from which a couple of brilliant young men 
broke away—and now in the 1970s were finding that the intelligent young have a renewed 
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interest in precisely those rejected philosophers: Hegel, the young Marx, and then more re-
cent German Idealists. (Magee 1986, p. 29) 
 
Magee and Quinton had in mindhere the movement of the so called ‗radical philoso-
phers‘. 
 Fortunatelly, the worry of these two philosophers turned out to be groundless. Never-
theless, nowadays it becomes increasingly apparent that German idealism found the 
chance to enter the new philosophical movement—from within. What do I have in mind 
here? The first break came already with Wittgenstein, and this in two ways. First, he in-
troduced in Britain the problem of ‗his Vienna‘—the Vienna of Otto Weininger: how to 
reconcile ethics with logic. Secondly, in the Tractatus he considerably Fregeanized Rus-
sell‘s logico-philosophy. It is not by accident that such a typically British philosopher 
like L. S. Stebbing regarded the Tractatus as essentially non-British.
6
 
 The real Teutonising of the English analytic philosophy came, however, only with the 
‗full-blooded Kantianism‘ (Strawson‘s own words) of P. F. Strawson Individuals 
(1959), and especially with the radical Fregeanism of M. Dummett. 
 (c) Analytic Philosophy and Modernity. Ryle was the first to notice that analytic phi-
losophy is a result of the institutional revolution which took place at the end of the last 
century. The main characteristic of this revolution was the radical secularising of society 
and education.
7
 As a result, a new ‗professional philosophy‘ emerged, the effect of 
which was the liberation from psychology
8
 and also from political sciences, religious 
studies and economics. 
 In Britain, the reform in the study of philosophy can be tracked down to 1822, when 
‗the system of honours and prices‘ was introduced. As Mark Pattison has noted in 1876, 
it turned philosophy into ‗mechanical work. . . . What the aspirant for honours requires 
                                                          
6
 See Milkov 2003. The aftermath of these developments was a further linguisticalising of analytic philos-
ophy in the Vienna Circle, which was canonised in America by Carnap and Tarski. 
7
 As Ryle put it, ‗between the time when Bradley was an undergraduate and the time when 1 was an un-
dergraduate the population of intellectuals, and particularly of academic intellectuals in the British Isles 
had changed from being a predominantly clerical to an almost entirely lay population.‘ (Ryle 1956, p. 2.) 
8
 Note in this connection the obsession of the logicians of the last century to be ‗free of any form of psy-
chologism‘. 
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is a repetiteur, who knows ―the schools‖.‘ (Pattison 1876, p. 89) Having these develop-
ments in view, the fall of ‗speculative‘ philosophy was easy to predict more than 120 
years ago. As Pattison concludes at the end of his essay, ‗for speculative effort, there is 
no place in such a system.‘ (p. 90) 
 Similarly, many major developments in analytic philosophy in the last fifty years 
were connected with institutional changes in British universities. These changes include, 
among other things, a dramatic rise in enrolment and the increase in number of faculties 
of philosophy after the World War II. All this required philosophy courses with a fixed 
subject in which it is evident to university authorities that there is something that had to 
be learned step-by-step: A subject that makes possible an objective and exact examina-
tion and jurying competing theses, papers, and books, just as it is done in the curriculum 
of other academic disciplines. 
 (d) Ideologically. Artur Danto has noted that the borders of analytic philosophy ‗are 
virtually coincident with the boundaries of capitalism‘ (Danto 1980, p. 615). In this he is 
right. Contemporary liberal capitalism is piecemeal, down to earth, systematically prov-
en by the reality of the market. In contrast, socialism was a grand theory, believing in a 
society organised according to a preliminary advanced, and accepted theory (ideology). 
In a sense, capitalism is analytical, the (real) socialism was (yes!) ‗speculative‘. 
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